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Abstract 
This article demonstrates that momentum, term structure and idiosyncratic volatility signals in 
commodity futures markets are not overlapping which inspires a novel triple-screen strategy. 
We show that simultaneously buying contracts with high past performance, high roll-yields 
and low idiosyncratic volatility, and shorting contracts with poor past performance, low roll-
yields and high idiosyncratic volatility yields a Sharpe ratio over the 1985 to 2011 period 
which is five times that of the S&P-GSCI. The triple-screen strategy dominates the double-
screen and individual strategies and this outcome cannot be attributed to overreaction, 
liquidity risk, transaction costs or the financialization of commodity futures markets.  
 
Keywords: Commodity futures, Momentum, Term structure, Idiosyncratic volatility.  
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1. Introduction 
The recent literature on commodity futures pricing has shown that long-short portfolios based 
on various signals can capture the risk premium of commodity futures, although their ability 
to explain the cross-section variation in returns is still subject to debate (Daskalaki et al., 
2012; Bakshi et al., 2013; Szymanowska et al., 2013). These signals are based on momentum 
(Erb & Harvey, 2006; Miffre & Rallis, 2007; Shen et al., 2007; Szakmary et al., 2010), the 
slope of the term structure of commodity futures prices (Erb & Harvey, 2006; Gorton & 
Rouwenhorst, 2006), inventory levels (Gorton et al., 2012), hedging pressure (Basu & Miffre, 
2013; Dewally et al., 2013) or idiosyncratic volatility (Miffre et al., 2013).  
This article is concerned with three of those signals, term structure, momentum and 
idiosyncratic volatility, labeled hereafter as TS, Mom and IVol, respectively. The TS signal 
consists of taking long positions in commodities with downward-sloping term structures (or 
positive roll-yields) and short positions in commodities with upward-sloping term structures 
(or negative roll-yields), and relates to the theory of storage (Working, 1949; Brennan, 1958) 
and thus to inventory considerations (Gorton et al., 2012).1 The other two signals, Mom and 
IVol, originated in the equity pricing literature with Jegadeesh & Titman (1993) proposing the 
long-short Mom strategy that buys recent winners and shorts recent losers2 and Ang et al. 
(2006, 2009) bringing forward the IVol strategy that buys stocks with low idiosyncratic 
                                                                
1
 When inventories are high, the TS is upward-sloping which encourages inventory holders to buy the 
physical commodity at a cheap price and sell it forward at a premium that exceeds the cost of storing 
and financing the commodity. The TS strategy recommends selling such contangoed commodities as 
their price tends to decline with contract maturity. When inventories are low, the TS is downward-
sloping because the convenience yield derived from owning the commodity spot then exceeds the 
costs of storage and financing incurred in the spot market. The TS strategy recommends buying such 
backwardated commodities as their price tends to rise with contract maturity. 
2
 While the profitability of momentum strategies is undisputed, there is still some debate regarding the 
reasons behind the profits. While Lesmond et al. (2004) and Chordia & Shivakumar (2002) attribute 
them to transaction costs or time-variation in expected returns, behavioral models such as Barberis et 
al. (1998), Daniel et al. (1998) and Hong & Stein (1999) relate the abnormal returns to cognitive 
errors that investors make when incorporating information into prices (see also Cooper et al., 2004). 
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volatility and sells stocks with high idiosyncratic volatility, where the latter is modeled 
relative to the three-factor model of Fama & French (1993).3  
The present article demonstrates that, when applied to commodities, the Mom, TS and IVol 
signals are non-overlapping which motivates the design of a new triple-screen strategy. 
Consistently buying commodity futures with high past performance, high roll-yields and low 
IVol and shorting contracts with poor past performance, low roll-yields and high IVol 
generates a sizeable Sharpe ratio that compares favorably to the one obtained when using the 
signals either in isolation or in pairs. Over the same period, the Sharpe ratio of the Standard & 
Poor’s Goldman Sachs Commodity Index (S&P-GSCI) is also notably smaller. In formal 
statistical tests, we demonstrate that the profitability of the long-short triple-screen portfolios 
is driven neither by liquidity risk, nor by overreaction, and is robust to transaction costs. We 
also show that the above findings are not purely an artifact of the recent financialization 
observed in commodity futures markets. Last but not least, the long-short portfolios formed 
via the triple-screening of signals are better able to diversify equity risk than the long-only 
S&P-GSCI portfolio. The added performance and increased diversification benefits come at 
the cost of losing the inflation hedge provided by long-only positions in commodities.  
The remainder of the paper unfolds as follows. Section 2 presents the dataset and Section 3 
discusses the extent to which the Mom, TS and IVol signals overlap as predictors of 
commodity futures returns. Section 4 outlines our triple-screen strategy and analyzes its 
performance. Section 5 presents various robustness checks before concluding in Section 6.  
                                                                
3
 A large literature tests whether IVol is priced in equity markets. Some articles advocate the presence 
of a zero relationship between IVol and equity returns as investors should not request a premium for 
holding a risk that is easy to diversify (e.g., Sharpe, 1964; Bali & Cakici, 2008; Huang et al., 2010; 
Han & Lesmond, 2011). Other papers show that the relationship is either positive (Merton, 1987; 
Goyal & Santa-Clara, 2003; Malkiel & Xu, 2004; Fu, 2009) or negative (Ang et al., 2006, 2009).  
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2. Data  
The analysis is based on the daily settlement prices of 27 commodity futures contracts over 
the period January 2, 1979 to August 31, 2011 which are downloaded from Datastream. The 
cross-section includes various styles such as agriculture (cocoa, coffee C, corn, cotton n°2, 
frozen concentrated orange juice, rough rice, oats, soybean meal, soybean oil, soybeans, sugar 
n° 11, wheat), energy (electricity, gasoline, heating oil n° 2, light sweet crude oil, natural gas), 
livestock (feeder cattle, frozen pork bellies, lean hogs, live cattle), metals (copper, gold, 
palladium, platinum, silver) and random length lumber. Daily settlement prices on the S&P-
GSCI over the same period are obtained from Bloomberg. 
In designing our commodity trading strategies, we make sure that the most liquid futures 
contracts (i.e., nearest or second-nearest to maturity) are held in the long-short portfolios. This 
is achieved by using the prices of the nearest contract until the last day of the month prior to 
maturity, when we roll then to the prices of the second-nearest contract.  
To establish robust evidence, we measure the performance of our strategies after factoring in 
the risk premium that investors may demand for holding illiquid assets. Since contracts 
located in the mid- to far-end of the term structure are less liquid, we model the liquidity risk 
premium, following Pastor & Stambaugh (2003), using all contracts available in the term 
structure of the 27 commodities over the period from January 1979 to August 2011. Thus we 
construct a liquidity risk premium series that spans the period from January 1985 to August 
2011. The latter implies that, effectively, January 1985 represents the beginning of the 
timeframe over which the performance of the strategies is studied.  
The long-short commodity portfolios are fully collateralized meaning that half of the trading 
capital is invested in risk-free interest bearing accounts for the both the long and short 
portfolios. Thus investors earn half of the returns of the ‘longs’ minus half of the returns of 
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the ‘shorts’. Unless we explicitly refer to total (i.e., excess plus collateral) returns, the 
empirical results presented in the paper are based on excess (i.e., total minus collateral) 
returns and will be simply referred to as returns. Proxying the risk-free rate by the 3-month 
US Treasury-bill rate implies that the collateral mean return over our effective sample period 
(1985-2011) stands at 4.10%. Thus, assuming no margin calls, the gross performance of the 
unlevered portfolios reported hereafter is understated by that amount.4  
3. Individual Momentum, Term Structure and Idiosyncratic Volatility Signals  
Recent papers suggest that Mom, TS and IVol signals have predictive content for commodity 
futures returns (see e.g., Erb & Harvey, 2006; Gorton & Rouwenhorst, 2006; Miffre & Rallis, 
2007; Miffre et al., 2013). This section discusses the three individual signals.  
 
3.1 Benchmark model for idiosyncratic volatility  
Unlike the momentum and term structure signals, the idiosyncratic volatility signal has to be 
defined on the basis of a chosen benchmark model which can be formalized as 
ݎ௜,ௗ ൌ ߙ௜ ൅ ࢼ௜′ࡲࢊ ൅ ߝ௜,ௗ ,        d = 1, …, D days                          (1) 
where ݎ௜,ௗ is the day d return of the ith commodity futures contract, ࡲࢊ is a vector of 
systematic risk premia, ߝ௜,ௗ is an innovation, and ሺߙ௜ , ࢼ௜′ ሻ are parameters estimated by OLS 
iteratively over the days spanned by a rolling window of R ={1, 3, 6 or 12} months. As in 
Ang et al. (2006, 2009), the IVol strategy buys (sells) the assets with the lowest (highest) IVol 
signal which is obtained as the residual standard deviation of the above time-series model. 
                                                                
4
 This is the approach adopted in Szakmary et al. (2010) and Basu & Miffre (2013). Others opt for 
levered portfolios (Erb & Harvey, 2006; Gorton & Rouwenhorst, 2006; Miffre & Rallis, 2007; Shen et 
al., 2007; Fuertes et al., 2010). Note that the choice of fully-collateralized long-short portfolios, as 
opposed to levered ones, is purely an “accounting” choice that affects means and standard deviations 
but has no influence on statistical significance or Sharpe ratios. 
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Which risk factors are plausible candidates for inclusion in the above equation? Two types of 
risk factors have been used in the commodities literature. On the one hand, there are factors 
inspired by traditional asset pricing models such as the equity market risk premium (Rm-Rf), 
the size and value risk premia of Fama & French (1993, SMB and HML), the S&P-GSCI or 
an equally-weighted portfolio of all commodity futures (EW). On the other hand, there are 
factors purposely designed to capture the fundamentals of backwardation and contango as 
modeled via long-short Mom, TS and hedging pressure portfolios.5 We consider all of them 
and, as the main task of this article is to demonstrate that combining Mom, TS and IVol 
signals is more useful than deploying the individual strategies, we select the benchmark 
model that gives the best performance for the IVol strategy. Thus, the task of improving upon 
the IVol strategy by overlaying Mom and TS signals to it becomes more challenging.  
Bearing the above rationale in mind, we extract the IVol signal from various traditional and 
fundamental benchmarks. The traditional benchmarks treat as risk factors the S&P-GSCI 
portfolio, an equally-weighted (EW) portfolio of all 27 commodities6, the equity market 
excess return (Rm-Rf), and the size (SMB) and value (HML) factors of Fama & French 
(1993). The fundamental benchmarks consider as risk premia long-short portfolios based on 
Mom, TS and hedging pressure. In each of the long-short strategies, we average the sorting 
signal over the past 12 months and hold the long-short positions for a month; for further 
details on the design of the hedging pressure portfolio, see Basu & Miffre (2013).  
                                                                
5
 Unlike the theory of storage of Working (1949) and Brennan (1958) and the hedging pressure 
hypothesis of Cootner (1960), the momentum strategy is not grounded in theory. But empirical studies 
have shown that winners exhibit backwardated characteristics such as positive roll-yields, low 
standardized inventories and net short hedging, while losers present contangoed features (Miffre & 
Rallis, 2007; Gorton et al., 2012; Dewally et al., 2013). Despite the fact that roll-yield, hedging 
pressure and past performance can be used as signals to capture the risk premium of commodity 
futures, there is an ongoing debate on whether these factors are priced cross-sectionally (see Daskalaki 
et al., 2012; Bakshi et al., 2013; Szymanowska et al., 2013). 
6
 The use of an equally-weighted portfolio of the commodities in our sample instead of the S&P-GSCI 
is motivated by the fact that the latter is heavily tilted towards energy commodities. 
8 
 
For a given benchmark, the IVol strategy then buys the quintile of commodities with the 
lowest IVol over the past R (=1, 3, 6 or 12) months, sells the quintile with the highest IVol 
and holds the fully-collateralized long-short portfolio for a month. Table 1 summarizes the 
performance of different IVol portfolios obtained according to various traditional benchmarks 
(Models A to D) and fundamental benchmarks (Models E to H). Almost all benchmarks are 
deployed over the period from 1985 to 2011. The exceptions are those that include the 
hedging pressure factor which, due to data availability at the CFTC (Commodity Futures 
Trading Commission), cover the slightly shorter period from 1987 to 2011.  
[Table 1 around here] 
The best performing IVol portfolios, based on benchmarks that use the S&P-GSCI as risk 
factor, earn a Sharpe ratio of 0.38 on average across the different ranking periods. The 
strategies that rely on fundamental benchmarks generate lower Sharpe ratios (0.21 across 
Models E and H of Table 1) than those obtained using traditional benchmarks (0.35 across 
Models A to D). These results are consistent with those reported in Miffre et al. (2013) who 
argue 1. that the IVol strategy works in commodity futures markets only when the IVol signal 
is extracted relative to a traditional version of Merton’s (1973) ICAPM and 2. that the 
decrease in Sharpe ratios obtained in Table 1 while moving from traditional to fundamental 
benchmarks relates to the pricing of contangoed portfolios. 
In the paper, according to the above rationale, we employ as IVol signal the residual standard 
deviation from the benchmark model based on the S&P-GSCI as single risk factor.7 We are 
                                                                
7 One could argue that our IVol strategy is, effectively, buying commodities with low total volatility 
and shorting commodities with high total volatility. In order to address this concern, we compute the 
returns and corresponding Sharpe ratios of long-short fully-collateralized portfolios formed according 
to the total volatility signal (i.e., standard deviation of commodity returns) and contrast them with 
those reported in Table 1, Panel A. The Sharpe ratios of the total-volatility strategy are far less 
attractive ranging from a low of 0.1320 (R=6) to a high of 0.2120 (R=3), which are roughly half those 
of our chosen IVol strategy based on the S&P-GSCI. Hence, the two signals are not identical. 
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mindful that the term idiosyncratic volatility is a misnomer given that those residuals are not 
white noise but, nevertheless, we adopt it like other studies such as Ang et al. (2006, 2009) 
who also recognize that IVol might proxy for the risk of a yet-to-be-specified missing factor. 
3.2 Design and Performance of Individual Strategies 
We deploy three strategies based on Mom, TS or IVol, respectively. At the time of portfolio 
formation we extract the signals over various ranking windows (R=1, 3, 6 or 12 months) and 
sort the available cross-section of commodities accordingly. The sorting signal for Mom is the 
past performance of each commodity over the past R months. The sorting signal for TS is the 
roll-yield of each commodity measured as the log price differential between front and second 
nearest contracts and averaged out over the past R months. As detailed above, the sorting 
signal for IVol is the residual standard deviation from (1) using S&P-GSCI as risk factor. 
In each of them, the long portfolio is the quintile that is expected to outperform based on the 
corresponding signal; i.e., the 20% of commodities with best past performance, highest 
average roll-yields or lowest levels of IVol. The short portfolio is the quintile that is expected 
to underperform based on the signal; i.e., the 20% of commodities with the worst past 
performance, the lowest average roll-yields or the highest levels of IVol. As we employ four 
ranking periods, we have four individual long-short Mom, TS or IVol strategies. Following 
Erb & Harvey (2006) and Ang et al. (2006, 2009), the long-short portfolios are held for one 
month, at the end of which the portfolio formation process is repeated again and so forth. 
Our choice of percentile to form the long and short portfolios (i.e., top and bottom quintiles) 
follows from the strategy for equities promoted in Ang et al. (2006, 2009) and also from the 
literature on commodity futures markets (e.g., Erb & Harvey, 2006; Gorton & Rouwenhorst, 
2006). The sensitivity of the results to the percentile of choice is examined in Section 4.1. In 
order to avoid portfolio concentration on specific commodities and thus ensure better 
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diversification, equal weights are given to the constituents of each (top and bottom) quintile. 
However, the equal-weighting scheme could exacerbate illiquidity problems, making it 
difficult for investors to open or close positions. We examine in Section 5.2 the extent to 
which the performance of our triple-screen portfolios relates to a liquidity risk premium.  
Table 2 summarizes the performance of long-short fully-collateralized Mom, TS and IVol 
portfolios alongside the performance of the long-only S&P-GSCI portfolio. 
[Insert Table 2 around here] 
The Sharpe ratios of the long-short portfolios range from 0.19 to 0.47 with an average at 0.37, 
whereas that of the S&P-GSCI merely stands at 0.14. Likewise, the Sortino ratio and Omega 
ratio of the long-short portfolios are consistently higher than those of the S&P-GSCI, 
averaging 0.17 and 1.33, respectively, versus 0.06 and 1.11 for the S&P-GSCI. This 
reinforces the widely-held view that investors benefit from taking long positions in 
backwardated markets and short positions in contangoed markets.  
3.3 Disentangling the Three Signals 
In order to motivate the triple-screen strategy we need to provide evidence that the three 
signals do not contain identical information. For this purpose, we employ two distinct 
approaches based on correlations and cross-section regressions, respectively.  
We begin by computing pairwise correlations between the long-short Mom, TS and IVol 
portfolio returns  each portfolio is formed by equally-weighting the corresponding strategies 
corresponding to the ranking periods of 1, 3, 6 and 12 months. The return correlations are 
indeed low ranging from 10% (p-value of 0.08) between the Mom and IVol portfolios, to 21% 
(p-value of 0.00) between the TS and IVol portfolios. As highlighted in Miffre & Rallis 
(2007), Gorton et al. (2012) and Dewally et al. (2013) inter alios, all these portfolios are 
deemed to capture the fundamentals of backwardation and contango, so it is not surprising to 
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see that their returns are positively correlated. Yet, the correlations are small, suggesting that 
the allocations do not fully overlap. In simple words, when we buy a past winner, we are not 
necessarily buying a commodity with high roll-yield or low IVol. Likewise, when we sell a 
past loser, we are not necessarily selling a commodity with low roll-yield or high IVol. 
The second approach builds on the methodology proposed by George & Hwang (2004) also 
used by Park (2010). Each month t we run the following cross-sectional regression 
 ݎ௜,௧ ൌ ܾ଴,௧ ൅ ܾଵ,௧݈݊൫ܱܫ௜,௧ିଵ൯ ൅ ܾଶ,௧ܯ݋݉ܮ௜,௧ିଵ ൅ ܾଷ,௧ܯ݋݉ ௜ܵ,௧ିଵ ൅ ܾସ,௧ܶܵܮ௜,௧ିଵ ൅																									ܾହ,௧ܶܵ ௜ܵ,௧ିଵ ൅ ܾ଺,௧ܫܸ݋݈ܮ௜,௧ିଵ ൅ ܾ଻,௧ܫܸ݋݈ ௜ܵ,௧ିଵ ൅ ݁௜,௧                     (2) 
where ݎ௜.௧ is the ith commodity futures return, ܱܫ௜.௧ିଵ is the lagged dollar value of open interest 
as control for illiquidity effects, and the remaining regressors are dummy variables. ܯ݋݉ܮ௜.௧ିଵ takes value 1 if the ith commodity is included in the long Mom portfolio formed at 
time t-1 using information over the previous R months, and 0 otherwise; ܯ݋݉ ௜ܵ,௧ିଵ is defined 
similarly with reference to the short Mom portfolio. ܶܵܮ௜,௧ିଵ equals 1 if the ith commodity is 
included in the long TS portfolio formed at time t-1 based on average roll-yields over the 
previous R months, and 0 otherwise; ܶܵ ௜ܵ,௧ିଵ is defined similarly with reference to the short 
TS portfolio. ܫܸ݋݈ܮ௜,௧ିଵ	and ܫܸ݋݈ ௜ܵ,௧ିଵ	are defined likewise but based on each commodity's 
IVol over the previous R months. The model error is denoted ݁௜,௧, and ሺܾ଴,௧ , ܾଵ,௧ , … , ܾ଻,௧ሻ′ are 
unknown parameters that can be consistently estimated by OLS.  
Given the ranking periods of 1, 3, 6 and 12 months, we end up with four sets of cross-section 
regressions whose coefficients are averaged in order to compute ൫ ෠ܾଶ,௧ െ ෠ܾଷ,௧൯ ʹ⁄ , ൫ ෠ܾସ,௧ െ ෠ܾହ,௧൯ ʹ⁄  and ൫ ෠ܾ଺,௧ െ ෠ܾ଻,௧൯ ʹ⁄ . These differentials can be interpreted as the excess 
returns of fully-collateralized pure strategies. For example, ൫ ෠ܾଶ,௧ െ ෠ܾଷ,௧൯ ʹ⁄  measures the 
monthly mean excess return that investors demand for taking on the risk of momentum 
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trading after controlling for the risks embedded in the term structure and idiosyncratic 
volatility signals. Table 3 shows the average coefficients in Panel A and the annualized mean 
excess returns of the pure strategies in Panel B. The results are reported over the full sample 
period from February 1985 to August 2011, and over two non-overlapping subsamples of 
roughly equal length (February 1985 to August 1997, and September 1997 to August 2011).  
[Insert Table 3 around here] 
The results in Panel A show over the whole sample that for a given signal either the long or 
short dummy is significantly priced cross-sectionally which suggests that each of the three 
signals has its own merit and hence, investors could extract profits from their combination.8 
Consistent with the negative relationship between liquidity and expected returns found 
elsewhere (Brennan et al., 1998), the coefficient on open interest is negative. These cross-
sectional regressions provide evidence, prima facie, that the profitability of the long-short 
strategies is not merely a compensation for illiquidity; this issue is revisited in Section 5.2. 
The results over the two sub-periods in Table 3 reveal that there is some time variation in the 
relative importance of the factors that command a risk premium in commodity futures 
markets. In fact, some of the results over the full period appear largely driven by one of the 
subperiods. But overall we can conclude that the signals do not fully overlap. 
The results in Panel B over the full sample period suggest that the pure Mom and IVol signals 
earn an average return of 3.87% and 4.66%, respectively, versus a lower 2.20% for the pure 
TS signal.9 The sub-sample analysis reveals that the relative strength of the three pure signals 
                                                                
8
 The results are not sensitive to the inclusion of ܴ௜,௧ିଵ, as in George & Hwang (2004). The coefficient 
of the lagged monthly return is very small at 0.0107 and insignificant (t-statistic =0.77).  
9
 We also deployed the two-step methodology of Fama & McBeth (1973) and, reassuringly, the 
findings do not qualitatively challenge our main inferences based on George & Hwang (2004). The 
long and long-short (short) TS and IVol portfolios are found to command positive (negative) risk 
premiums that are significant at conventional levels. The risk premium associated with the long-short 
momentum portfolio, albeit positive, is found to be non-significant. The coefficient on open interest is 
negative and significant. More details are available from the authors upon request. 
13 
 
varies over time but all of them yield attractive returns; exceptions are the TS signals and 
Mom signals in the first and second sub-periods, respectively. 
4. Combined Momentum, Term Structure and Idiosyncratic Volatility Signals 
4.1 Design and Performance of Triple-Screen Strategy  
Having shown that the predictive power of Mom, TS and IVol signals for commodity futures 
returns is not tantamount, we now design a triple-screen (or combined) strategy. Our main 
task is then to demonstrate in a robust way that such a combined strategy is worthwhile in the 
sense that it provides a superior risk-return profile than that afforded by the individual signals.  
Over each month of the sample period we deploy the following screening approach which 
builds on Achour et al. (1998). Three scores are assigned to each of the N commodities at the 
time of portfolio formation according to past performance (Mom), roll-yields (TS) and IVol 
over the previous R-months window. The highest score of N is given to the commodity with 
the best past performance, and the lowest score of 1 is given to the commodity with the worst 
past performance. Likewise, the highest score of N is given to the commodity with the highest 
average roll-yield, and the lowest score of 1 is given to the commodity with the lowest 
average roll-yield. Finally, the highest score of N is given to the commodity with the lowest 
IVol, and the lowest score of 1 is given to the commodity with the highest IVol. We sort the 
commodities based on their total score, buy the quintile with the highest total score, sell the 
quintile with the lowest total score and hold the long-short portfolio for one month. 
Figure 1 plots the future value of $1 invested in the long-only S&P-GSCI portfolio, and the 
long-short portfolios based on: i) Mom, ii) TS, iii) IVol, and iv) all three signals (triple-
screen). Since four signal lengths R are considered for the long-short portfolios, for simplicity, 
the figure plots the future value of a fully-collateralized portfolio that equally-weights the four 
long-short portfolios arising from the four signal lengths. The graph suggests that combining 
14 
 
the three signals adds value relative to exploiting them individually. All the long-short 
portfolios are more profitable than the long-only S&P-GSCI for most of the period.  
[Insert Figure 1 around here] 
Table 4 shows the performance of long, short and long-short (fully-collateralized) triple-
screen portfolios. The long portfolios earn positive and significant mean returns that average 
8.34% per annum while the short portfolios earn negative mean returns that average -6.44% 
per annum. Thus the long-short triple-screen strategies yield positive mean returns that are 
strongly significant both statistically and economically, ranging from 5.80% to 8.27% per 
annum with an average at 7.39%. This represents a substantial improvement in performance 
relative to the S&P-GSCI and the individual strategies that we studied earlier on. 
[Insert Table 4 around here] 
By comparing the risk measures in Panels B of Tables 2 and 4, it is noticeable that the triple-
screen strategies are to some extent less risky than the single-screen counterparts or the S&P-
GSCI. For example, the maximum drawdown of the triple-screen portfolios ranges from -
30.75% and -14.97% with an average at -23.57%, while the maximum drawdown of the 
single-screen strategies ranges from -58.64% to -19.94% with an average at -34.41%, 
suggesting that the later are more risky. Likewise, the skewness of the triple-screen strategies 
often exceeds that of the S&P-GSCI or that of the single-screens. In fact, as Table 4 shows, 
the percentage of positive months and the maximum 12-month rolling returns are higher for 
the triple-screen strategies (59.23% and 38.42%, respectively) than for any of the individual 
strategies (54.56% and 34.52%, respectively). 
Table 4, Panel C, shows that the triple-screen portfolios improve substantially upon the 
individual counterparts in terms of risk-adjusted performance. For example, the Sharpe ratios 
of the triple-screen portfolios, ranging from 0.52 to 0.77 and averaging at 0.69, show a 
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substantial improvement over that of individual strategies (that range from 0.19 to 0.47 in 
Table 2). The average Sharpe ratio of the triple-screen strategies is also five times higher than 
that of the S&P-GSCI that merely stands at 0.14 over the same time period (c.f., Table 2). 
Table 5 summarizes the performance of the strategies in various settings: I) full sample period 
from February 1985 to August 2011; II) two sub-periods of roughly equal length from 
February 1985 to August 1997, and from September 1997 to August 2011; III) two sub-
periods, respectively, preceding and reflecting the financialization of commodity futures 
markets roughly dated January 2006 as suggested, e.g. in Stoll and Whaley (2010); IV) two 
sub-periods pre and post January 2000 on the basis of the dynamics shown in Figure 1 for the 
triple-screen strategy; and V) two sub-periods, respectively, preceding and reflecting the late 
2000s financial crisis using July 2007 as approximate date, see e.g., Brunnermeier (2009). 
[Insert Table 5 around here] 
Examining the performance of the triple-screen strategy over time (Panel A in Table 5), we 
conclude that it is time-varying, as one would expect; in fact, the strategies perform better 
over the recent past. However, almost over all the sub-periods considered, the Sharpe ratios of 
the triple-screen strategies are fairly high (above 0.5) and hence, attractive to commodity 
investors. Moreover, for most of the sub-periods the Sharpe ratios of the triple-screen 
strategies exceed those of the individual strategies. The sub-sample analysis therefore 
confirms the results presented earlier; namely, investors are better off combining the signals. 
Next we examine the sensitivity of the results reported in Table 4 to the number of 
commodities included in the long and short portfolios out of those available.10 Accordingly, 
                                                                
10
 Our baseline triple-screen strategy is based on the most extreme quintiles, i.e. the top or first quintile 
(long portfolio) and the bottom or fifth quintile (short portfolio). The performance of the triple-screen 
strategy based on the second and fourth quintiles deteriorates as one would expect  the average 
Sharpe ratio averages 0.33 across ranking periods versus the 0.69 reported in Table 4 for the top and 
bottom quintiles. This confirms that investors are better off trading the most extreme quintiles. 
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we analyze the performance of triple-screen strategies that include in the long and short 
portfolios, respectively: (A) the single commodity ranked top and the single commodity 
ranked bottom according to the triple score measure; (B) the top and bottom 10% of 
commodities, also called deciles, and (C) the top and bottom 30% of commodities. The results 
show that the triple-screen portfolios with zero diversification, strategy (A) above, earn more 
at 11.76% on average across all four ranking periods than the best diversified counterpart 
portfolios, strategy (C) above, whose average performance stands at 5.97% on average. 
However, on a risk-adjusted basis as captured by the Sharpe ratios, the triple-screen strategies 
performance improves with the diversification, ranging from an average of 0.54 for the least-
diversified portfolios that contain 1 commodity in the long and short portfolios to an average 
of 0.71 for the most diversified portfolios with 30% of the available cross-section in the long 
and short portfolios. Detailed results on this sensitivity analysis are available upon request.  
Finally, in order to offer more intuition on the triple-screen strategy, Appendix A reports the 
frequency with which each commodity enters the long and short portfolios. We also present 
the beta of each commodity relative to S&P-GSCI and the corresponding R2 statistic of 
equation (1) estimated over the whole sample period 1985-2011. The results indicate that the 
triple-screen strategy primarily buys cattle and energy contracts (that rank high in terms of 
exposure to the S&P-GSCI), sells agricultural commodities such as cocoa, coffee and oats, 
and ignores commodities in the soy complex, rough rice or electricity.  
4.2 Risk Diversification and Inflation Hedging 
Performance, risk diversification and inflation hedging are the three main motives of investors 
to consider commodities in their strategic asset allocation (Bodie & Rosansky, 1980; Bodie, 
1983; Erb & Harvey, 2006; Gorton & Rouwenhorst, 2006). Our analysis thus far has 
established evidence that the triple-screen portfolios meet the first objective of delivering 
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good performance. The next question is then whether or not they are appropriate risk 
diversification and inflation hedging tools. To address this issue, we examine the extent to 
which the total returns of the long-short commodity portfolios correlate with the total returns 
of traditional assets (Standard & Poor’s 500 and Barclays bond index) and with inflation 
shocks.11 We then compare the diversification and inflation hedging properties of our long-
short portfolios to those provided by a long-only commodity portfolio such as the S&P-GSCI. 
The pairwise correlations and significance p-values are reported in Table 6. 
[Insert Table 6 around here] 
The long-short portfolio returns are essentially uncorrelated with the S&P 500 index returns 
and with Barclays bond index returns. The same qualitative evidence is obtained when the 
signals are exploited individually and when they are combined. Likewise, the correlation 
between the S&P-GSCI returns and Barclays bond index returns is insignificant. In contrast, 
the correlation between the S&P-GSCI returns and the S&P 500 index returns is significantly 
positive at 13%. This analysis shows that, while both long-only and long-short commodity 
portfolios act as good diversifiers of fixed income risk, investors interested in diversifying 
equity risk should opt for a long-short approach to commodity investing.  
Figure 2 plots the mean total returns per annum of the S&P 500 and S&P-GSCI indices, the 
triple-screen portfolios and the individual strategies. The time period is from July 2007, which 
roughly marks the beginning of the recent financial crisis, as suggested by Brunnermeier 
(2009) among others, until August 2011. Consistent with our previous correlation analysis, 
both the S&P 500 and the S&P-GSCI index lose on average a total of -5.03% and -3.11% per 
annum, respectively. Meanwhile, the long-short portfolios gain something between 3.76% and 
                                                                
11
 Inflation shocks are calculated as residuals of an ARMA model fitted to logarithmic monthly 
changes in the U.S. Consumer Price Index obtained from the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis. 
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11.46% per annum. Thus, the value of long-short commodity portfolios as diversifiers of 
equity risk is especially attractive since the beginning of the recent financial crisis. 
[Insert Figure 2 around here] 
In terms of inflation hedging, the S&P-GSCI ranks first, with the long-short portfolios 
offering little or no hedge. The enhanced diversification benefit and superior performance of 
long-short versus long-only investing come thus at the cost of an inferior inflation hedge. 
5. Robustness Analysis 
We now conduct some additional tests in an attempt to establish robust conclusions on the 
superiority of the long-short portfolios that jointly exploit the Mom, TS and IVol signals.  
 
5.1 Double-Screen versus Triple-Screen Strategies 
In order to provide convincing evidence on the merit of the proposed triple-screen strategy, it 
remains to be shown that it outperforms the simpler double-sort strategies that exploit either 
Mom and TS, IVol and TS or IVol and Mom signals. For this purpose, we form double-screen 
portfolios that long (short) the 20% of commodities with the highest (lowest) scores according 
to the signal pair at hand. We should stress that, so as to ensure that the comparison is as 
informative as possible, the current double-screen strategies are also based on the most 
extreme quintiles as grouping criteria, namely, they include the same number of commodities 
in their long and short portfolios as the single and triple-screen strategies previously analyzed 
(Tables 2 and 4). The summary statistics for the double-sort strategies are shown in Table 7.  
 [Insert Table 7 around here] 
The average performance stands at 6.28% a year on average for the double-screen in Table 7 
versus 7.39% a year for the triple-screen in Table 4. Likewise, the average Sharpe, Sortino 
and Omega ratios of 0.69, 0.33 and 1.69 for the triple-screen strategies (Table 4) are more 
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attractive than the corresponding 0.59, 0.28 and 1.57 for the double-screen strategies (Table 
7). Finally, we observe that combining signals in a double-screen strategy enhances 
performance relative to the individual strategies or to a long-only position in the S&P-GSCI. 
5.2 Liquidity Risk  
There remains the important concern of whether the outperformance of the triple-screen 
strategy is merely a manifestation of the risk premium that investors demand for holding 
illiquid commodities. This concern is directly confronted in two ways.12 First, we measure the 
portfolio’s alpha using a two-factor model that includes the S&P-GSCI and a liquidity risk 
premium (LRP) constructed à-la Pastor & Stambaugh (2003) using commodity futures data13  
ݎ௉,௧ ൌ ߙ ൅ ߚௌ&௉_ீௌ஼ூܵ&ܲ_ܩܵܥܫ௧ ൅ ߚ௅ோ௉ܮܴ ௧ܲ ൅ ߥ௉,௧															 					ሺ͵ሻ	
The significant alphas reported in Table 8 (Panel A), ranging from 5.35% to 7.36%, indicate 
that the outperformance of the triple-screen strategy is not an artifact of liquidity risk.  
[Insert Table 8 around here] 
We should stress that the interpretation of the alphas is intrinsically linked to the benchmark 
of choice, namely, in the present context all we can say is that the alphas represent the 
abnormal return of the strategy over and above what would be expected as compensation for 
taking systematic commodity market risk (S&P-GSCI) and liquidity risk.  
Thus, to provide more robust evidence we confront the liquidity issue in a different manner by 
re-applying the same strategies now to a restricted cross-section that only includes the 90% 
                                                                
12
 Moreover, the cross-sectional analysis presented in Table 3 indicated that the pure Mom, TS and 
IVol strategies are profitable even after the inclusion of lagged $OI as regressor which represents 
indirect evidence that the profitability of the signals is not merely a compensation for illiquidity.  
13
 To construct long-short liquidity risk mimicking portfolios the ranking period is fixed at 60 months, 
the holding period at 12 months, and each portfolio (long or short) contains 20% of all the contracts 
available at the time of portfolio formation along the entire term structure for each commodity. Further 
details on the liquidity risk mimicking portfolio construction are available from the authors. 
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most liquid commodity futures contracts. More specifically, at the time of portfolio formation 
we systematically filter out the 10% of commodities with the lowest average $OI over the 
preceding R months. Summary statistics are presented in Table 8, Panel B. A comparison of 
these results with those reported in Table 4 shows that differences in performance are 
negligible. For example, the average Sharpe ratios of the triple-screen portfolios are 0.69 in 
Table 4 when the asset allocation is based on the entire cross-section of commodities, and 
0.67 in Table 8, Panel B when the least liquid assets are filtered out. This confirms that the 
performance of the triple-screen strategies is not merely a compensation for liquidity risk. 
Reassuringly, the liquidity analysis does not challenge our main conclusion that the triple-
screen strategies improve upon the performance of each of the individual strategies  
The previous liquidity robustness check was addressed over the entire sample period. We now 
turn attention to the abnormal performance of the strategies in ‘tranquil’ versus ‘crisis’ times. 
This is done by augmenting the benchmark model formalized as equation (3) with a dummy 
variable equal to 1 from July 2007 onwards and 0 elsewhere. The abnormal performance of 
the strategies pre- and post-July 2007 is shown in Table 8, Panel C, where ߙ௧௥௔௡௤௨௜௟ is the 
intercept of the model, and ߙ௖௥௜௦௜௦ is the sum of the latter and the coefficient of the crisis 
dummy. In line with our previous findings, the alphas of the triple-screen strategy are more 
prominent in crisis (ߙ௖௥௜௦௜௦ = 12.30% on average) than in tranquil periods (ߙ௧௥௔௡௤௨௜௟ = 5.68% 
on average) but the strategy is worthwhile throughout with a lowest alpha of 3.96% a year. 
Although time-dependent, the outperformance is sustained. 
5.3 Transaction Costs 
The triple-screen portfolios are rebalanced monthly and draw upon a small cross-section of 
commodities that are often liquid, relatively cheap and easy to sell short. It is thus unlikely 
that their abnormal performance will be totally wiped out by the costs of implementing the 
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strategies. To formally assess this issue, we re-construct the portfolios applying transaction 
costs of 0.033% and 0.066% per commodity trade. These figures are quite conservative, e.g. 
Locke & Venkatesh’s (1997) estimates for futures trading costs range between 0.0004% and 
0.033% of notional value. These trading costs are employed each time that a commodity is 
bought or sold in the portfolio, in addition of the small amount of commodities that are bought 
or sold each month because of the monthly rebalancing to 1/N. Table 9 presents the gross and 
net performance of the triple-screen and individual strategies. Net of reasonable transaction 
costs (TC), the triple-screen strategies generate mean return of 7.10% (TC=0.033%) and 
6.82% (TC=0.066%) per annum on average, which are similar in magnitude to the average 
gross returns of 7.39% (TC=0%). The decline in abnormal performance is thus negligible. 
[Insert Table 9 around here] 
To conduct this robustness check in a different manner, we resort now to a break-even 
transaction cost approach and calculate the required level of cost per commodity trade that 
makes the mean return of the strategy not larger than zero. Greater break-even costs 
correspond with less trading-intensive strategies. The results are reported on the right-hand 
side of Table 9. The pattern of break-even transaction costs observed over ranking periods is 
as one would expect: the asset allocation signals are more stable as the ranking period 
increases, thus we rebalance less frequently, and accordingly, the break-even costs increase 
uniformly. The break-even cost levels for triple-screen strategy equal to 1.11% on average, 
ranging from 0.40% to 1.82%, and are substantially higher than Locke & Venkatesh's (1997) 
ceiling estimate at 0.033% per commodity trade. Hence, significant mean returns remain after 
plausible levels of transaction costs. Last but not least, after accounting for transaction costs 
the superior performance of the triple-screen versus the individual strategies still prevails. 
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5.4 Short-Term Overreaction and Mean Reversion 
This section tests the hypothesis that the performance of the triple-screen portfolios is not 
driven by short-term overreaction and a subsequent market correction. For this behavioral 
explanation to hold, the triple-sort strategies ought to become unprofitable as the holding 
period lengthens. Figure 3 presents average Sharpe ratios over holding periods from 1 to 72 
months (i.e., 6 years) of the individual and triple-screen strategies considered.  
[Insert Figure 3 around here] 
Although the evolution in the observed Sharpe ratios is non-monotonic, there is a clear 
contrast regarding the long-term trend in performance between the IVol strategy, on the one 
hand, and the Mom and TS strategies, on the other hand. We can see that, in line with 
Jegadeesh & Titman (2001), the Mom portfolios perform poorly as the holding period rises. A 
similar observation applies to the TS portfolios whose performance tends to mean revert. 
These gradual long-term declines in performance are not borne out, however, by the Sharpe 
ratio of the individual IVol strategies.14 The contrast can partly explain why the performance 
of the triple-screen strategy deteriorates with the holding period but only by a negligible 
amount compared, for instance, to the Mom strategy. Altogether, this represents reasonable 
evidence to conclude that the risk-adjusted performance of the triple-screen strategies applies 
to long, as well as short, horizons, ruling out a behavioral explanation based on overreaction 
and subsequent mean reversion. 
5.5 Can the Financialization of Commodity Futures Markets Explain Performance? 
The flow of cash into commodity markets and its potentially destabilizing role on prices are 
the subject of an intense and on-going debate both in political and regulatory circles and 
amongst academics (for a recent review of the literature see, e.g. Cheng & Xiong, 2013). We 
                                                                
14
 This is consistent with the findings in Ang et al. (2006) who conclude that behavioral explanations 
are unlikely to account for the performance of equity-based IVol portfolios. 
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observed in the results shown in Figure 1 and Table 5 that the triple-screen strategies perform 
particularly well in the recent past; namely, at the time of the financialization of commodity 
futures markets. Hence, one may hypothesize that large speculators, by increasing their long 
and short positions in commodity futures markets, influence the performance of the triple-
screen strategies. Using the notion of causality proposed by Granger (1969), the above 
hypothesis is tested by estimating the following regression model using monthly data: 
ݎ௉,௧ ൌ ߜ଴ ൅ ߜଵ∆ܱܫ௜,௧ିଵ ൅ ߜଶݎ௉,௧ିଵ ൅ ߥ௉,௧                                         (4) 
where ݎ௉,௧ is the triple-screen portfolio return and ∆ܱܫ௜,௧ is the change in the long (or short) 
open interest of large speculators for the ith commodity. The hypothesis that the change in the 
long (or short) open interest of large speculators does not Granger-cause the performance of 
the strategies is formulated as ܪ଴: ߜଵ ൌ 0. The results can be found in Appendix B. Since only 
4% of the significance t-ratios for ߜଵ fall outside the 95% confidence bands, we can conclude 
that the change in speculators' positions has no impact on performance. 
6. Conclusions 
This article focuses on momentum, term structure and idiosyncratic volatility signals that have 
been shown to predict commodity futures returns in the recent literature. Idiosyncratic 
volatility is defined with respect to the S&P-GSCI as benchmark. We expand upon the extant 
literature by showing that the three signals are independent enough which legitimates the 
design of a triple-screen strategy that combines all three signals. Over the period from 1985 to 
2011, investors who systematically buy commodities with high past performance, high 
average roll-yields and low idiosyncratic volatility, on the one hand, and short commodities 
with poor past performance, low average roll-yields and high idiosyncratic volatility, on the 
other hand, obtain an average Sharpe ratio of 0.69. Instead the average Sharpe ratio of long-
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short portfolios based on the individual signals merely stands at 0.37, and that of the S&P-
GSCI is even lower at 0.14. Robustness tests confirm that the triple-screen strategies also 
outperform double-screen strategies and their superior performance cannot be attributed to 
liquidity risk or transaction costs. Moreover, the superior profitability of the triple-screen 
strategies is neither driven by short-term overreaction and subsequent mean reversion, nor by 
the recent financialization of commodity futures markets. Finally, the triple-screen portfolios 
are found useful at diversifying equity risk but not as inflation hedge. 
The main scope of this article has been to investigate the effectiveness of combining 
momentum, term structure and idiosyncratic volatility signals. An open question is whether 
overlaying other signals based on inventory levels or hedging pressure (Gorton et al., 2012; 
Basu & Miffre, 2013) could yield better performance. This is an avenue for future research. 
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Table 1. Idiosyncratic volatility signal and benchmark model. 
 
The table presents summary statistics for individual idiosyncratic volatility (IVol) strategies 
where the signal is modeled relative to traditional benchmarks in Models A to D that consider 
as risk factors: i) the S&P-GSCI, ii) the equally-weighted portfolio of all commodity futures 
(EW), iii) the equity market excess returns (Rm-Rf), and the size and value premia of Fama & 
French (1993, SMB and HML), or fundamental benchmarks in Models E to H that treat as 
risk factors: i) the commodity-based momentum (Mom), ii) term structure (TS) and iii) 
hedging pressure portfolios. The ranking period over which the IVol signals are modeled is 
denoted R and is expressed in months. Mean stands for annualized mean excess return, SD 
stands for annualized standard deviation. t-statistics are in parentheses. All but one model are 
estimated over the period from February 1985 to August 2011, the exception being the model 
with hedging pressure risk (Models G and H) that is only feasible over the period January 
1987 to August 2011 due to data constraints. 
 
 
  
R = 1 R = 3 R = 6 R = 12 Average R = 1 R = 3 R = 6 R = 12 Average
Model A: S&P‐GSCI factor Model E: Mom factor
Mean 0.0454 0.0437 0.0399 0.0500 0.0448 Mean 0.0291 0.0234 0.0189 0.0213 0.0232
(2.00) (1.93) (1.78) (2.16) (1.36) (1.04) (0.88) (1.03)
SD 0.1171 0.1162 0.1148 0.1176 0.1164 SD 0.1107 0.1165 0.1103 0.1069 0.1111
Sharpe ratio 0.3878 0.3759 0.3478 0.4255 0.3843 Sharpe ratio 0.2628 0.2005 0.1711 0.1997 0.2085
Model B: EW factor Model F: TS factor
Mean 0.0375 0.0362 0.0262 0.0378 0.0344 Mean 0.0303 0.0144 0.0098 0.0133 0.0169
(1.82) (1.73) (1.28) (1.91) (1.29) (0.64) (0.44) (0.62)
SD 0.1063 0.1075 0.1053 0.1002 0.1048 SD 0.1211 0.1167 0.1156 0.1106 0.1160
Sharpe ratio 0.3526 0.3366 0.2493 0.3774 0.3290 Sharpe ratio 0.2501 0.1238 0.0844 0.1200 0.1446
Model C: Rm‐Rf, SMB, HML and S&P‐GSCI factors Model G: Hedging Pressure factor
Mean 0.0389 0.0423 0.0431 0.0514 0.0440 Mean 0.0435 0.0298 0.0199 0.0281 0.0303
(1.77) (1.88) (1.92) (2.23) (1.99) (1.20) (0.83) (1.19)
SD 0.1132 0.1157 0.1148 0.1170 0.1152 SD 0.1085 0.1223 0.1175 0.1150 0.1158
Sharpe ratio 0.3437 0.3661 0.3755 0.4396 0.3812 Sharpe ratio 0.4006 0.2435 0.1691 0.2442 0.2643
Model D: Rm‐Rf, SMB, HML and EW factors Model H: Mom, TS and Hedging Pressure factors
Mean 0.0311 0.0356 0.0269 0.0338 0.0318 Mean 0.0225 0.0159 0.0302 0.0313 0.0250
(1.54) (1.72) (1.33) (1.73) (1.08) (0.69) (1.36) (1.43)
SD 0.1043 0.1062 0.1034 0.0992 0.1033 SD 0.1031 0.1136 0.1089 0.1064 0.1080
Sharpe ratio 0.2985 0.3347 0.2596 0.3408 0.3084 Sharpe ratio 0.2177 0.1401 0.2776 0.2941 0.2324
Traditional benchmarks Fundamental benchmarks
29 
 
 
 
Table 2. Performance of momentum, term structure and idiosyncratic volatility strategies. 
 
The table presents summary statistics for the excess returns of the S&P-GSCI and fully-collateralized long-short momentum, term structure and 
idiosyncratic volatility (IVol) portfolios. Past performance and average roll-yields are measured over ranking periods R spanning 1 to 12 months. IVol is 
measured as the standard deviation from regressions of daily commodity futures returns on the S&P-GSCI over the same ranking periods. The long 
portfolio buys the quintile with either the best past performance, the highest average roll-yields or the lowest IVol and the short portfolio sells the quintile 
with either the worst past performance, the lowest average roll-yields or the highest IVol. t-statistics are in parentheses. The sample covers the period from 
February 1985 to August 2011. 
 
 
 
R = 1 R = 3 R = 6 R = 12 Average R = 1 R = 3 R = 6 R = 12 Average R = 1 R = 3 R = 6 R = 12 Average
Panel A: Excess returns
Annualized arithmetic mean 0.0476 0.0596 0.0255 0.0614 0.0485 0.0206 0.0445 0.0447 0.0369 0.0367 0.0454 0.0437 0.0399 0.0500 0.0448 0.0281
(1.93) (2.38) (1.08) (2.36) (0.98) (2.24) (2.21) (1.74) (2.00) (1.93) (1.78) (2.16) (0.71)
Annualized geometric mean 0.0397 0.0514 0.0182 0.0528 0.0405 0.0146 0.0393 0.0394 0.0311 0.0311 0.0385 0.0369 0.0334 0.0431 0.0380 0.0069
Panel B: Risk measures
Annualized volatility 0.1271 0.1284 0.1207 0.1320 0.1270 0.1087 0.1021 0.1035 0.1075 0.1054 0.1171 0.1162 0.1148 0.1176 0.1164 0.2043
Annualized downside volatility (0%) 0.0734 0.0676 0.0726 0.0762 0.0725 0.0754 0.0660 0.0676 0.0765 0.0714 0.0884 0.0743 0.0682 0.0795 0.0776 0.1438
Skewness 0.3291 0.4253 0.0353 0.2237 0.2533 ‐0.2599 0.1081 0.0089 ‐0.3257 ‐0.1172 ‐0.7679 ‐0.2317 ‐0.0721 ‐0.2674 ‐0.3348 ‐0.2740
Kurtosis 4.3205 3.8344 3.1141 3.5672 3.7090 6.3463 4.5211 3.8663 4.4598 4.7984 7.2079 3.7478 3.2926 4.2937 4.6355 5.4066
99% VaR (Cornish‐Fisher) 0.0823 0.0744 0.0790 0.0816 0.0793 0.1010 0.0729 0.0716 0.0859 0.0829 0.1197 0.0853 0.0777 0.0908 0.0934 0.1782
% of positive months 0.5486 0.5331 0.5191 0.5422 0.5358 0.5141 0.5521 0.5446 0.5487 0.5399 0.5799 0.5521 0.5605 0.5519 0.5611 0.5281
Maximum run‐up (consecutive) 1.1950 1.2734 1.0308 1.1351 1.1586 1.0019 1.5474 1.0253 0.9181 1.1232 0.9958 0.8072 0.9138 1.2612 0.9945 1.7566
Run‐up length (months) 7 9 7 5 7 9 10 8 12 10 8 7 9 9 8 8
Maximum drawdown ‐0.5864 ‐0.3581 ‐0.3242 ‐0.4257 ‐0.4236 ‐0.5116 ‐0.3279 ‐0.2589 ‐0.1994 ‐0.3244 ‐0.3153 ‐0.2294 ‐0.2641 ‐0.3287 ‐0.2844 ‐0.7030
Drawdown length (months) 123 28 97 36 71 168 9 7 7 48 71 61 72 66 68 8
Maximum 12M rolling return 0.3887 0.4067 0.3088 0.4332 0.3843 0.3086 0.3313 0.2843 0.3358 0.3150 0.3821 0.3426 0.3213 0.2987 0.3362 0.5355
Minimum 12M rolling return ‐0.3418 ‐0.3271 ‐0.2403 ‐0.2632 ‐0.2931 ‐0.2878 ‐0.3567 ‐0.1632 ‐0.1972 ‐0.2512 ‐0.2668 ‐0.2078 ‐0.2142 ‐0.2018 ‐0.2226 ‐0.9133
Panel C: Risk‐adjusted performance
Sharpe ratio 0.3748 0.4638 0.2111 0.4656 0.3788 0.1893 0.4356 0.4325 0.3433 0.3502 0.3878 0.3759 0.3478 0.4255 0.3843 0.1375
Sortino ratio (0%) 0.1723 0.2253 0.0912 0.2200 0.1772 0.0791 0.1979 0.1945 0.1460 0.1544 0.1606 0.1625 0.1528 0.1859 0.1655 0.0564
Omega ratio (0%) 1.3256 1.4134 1.1678 1.4222 1.3322 1.1585 1.4025 1.3953 1.3051 1.3154 1.3468 1.3154 1.2872 1.3802 1.3324 1.1127
Term structure Idiosyncratic Volatility
S&P‐GSCIMomentum
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Table 3. Pure momentum, term structure and idiosyncratic volatility signals. 
 
The table reports in Panel A the coefficient estimates of cross-sectional regressions of 
commodity futures returns on lagged dollar open interest and 6 dummy variables as 
formalized in equation (2). Long Mom dummy equals 1 (0) for commodity i if it is 
included in (excluded from) the long momentum portfolio; Short Mom dummy equals 
1 (0) for commodity i if it included in (excluded from) the short momentum portfolio. 
Long TS (IVol) and Short TS (IVol) dummies are similarly defined with respect to 
the term structure (idiosyncratic volatility) portfolios. The coefficient estimates 
reported are averages over ranking periods of 1, 3, 6 and 12 months, and t-statistics 
for the significance of the averages are reported in the next column. Panel B reports 
the annualized mean returns of fully-collateralized long-short strategies based on pure 
Mom, TS and IVol signals and significance t-statistics. The results are for the full 
sample period from February 1985 to August 2011 and two non-overlapping periods 
of approximately equal length. 
 
 
 
Coeff. t‐stat Coeff. t‐stat Coeff. t‐stat
Panel A: Coefficients of cross‐section regressions
Intercept 0.0168 (3.10) 0.0448 (6.27) ‐0.0062 (‐0.79)
Open interest ‐0.0009 (‐3.20) ‐0.0024 (‐6.17) 0.0003 (0.72)
Long Mom dummy 0.0038 (2.27) 0.0047 (2.02) 0.0030 (1.25)
Short Mom dummy ‐0.0026 (‐1.59) ‐0.0046 (‐1.99) ‐0.0008 (‐0.35)
Long TS dummy 0.0006 (0.38) ‐0.0009 (‐0.46) 0.0017 (0.74)
Short TS dummy ‐0.0031 (‐2.06) 0.0001 (0.04) ‐0.0057 (‐2.80)
Long IVol dummy 0.0016 (1.21) ‐0.0026 (‐1.59) 0.0051 (2.63)
Short IVol dummy ‐0.0062 (‐3.44) ‐0.0091 (‐3.56) ‐0.0037 (‐1.49)
Panel B: Pure strategy
Momentum 0.0387 (2.86) 0.0558 (3.10) 0.0228 (1.16)
Term structure 0.0220 (1.87) ‐0.0062 (‐0.39) 0.0444 (2.67)
Idiosyncratic volatility 0.0466 (3.73) 0.0388 (2.18) 0.0531 (3.06)
Feb 1985 to Aug 2011 Feb 1985 to Aug 1997 Sept 1997 to Aug 2011
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Table 4. Performance of triple-screen momentum, term structure and idiosyncratic volatility strategies. 
 
The table presents summary statistics for the returns of fully-collateralized long, short and long-short portfolios. The asset allocation is based on triple-screen 
strategies that exploit momentum, term structure and idiosyncratic volatility signals. The signals are measured over ranking periods R ranging from 1 to 12 
months. Significance t-statistics are in parentheses. The sample covers the period from February 1985 to August 2011. 
 
 
  
R = 1 R = 3 R = 6 R = 12 Average R = 1 R = 3 R = 6 R = 12 Average R = 1 R = 3 R = 6 R = 12 Average
Panel A: Excess returns
Annualized arithmetic mean 0.0620 0.0793 0.0847 0.1078 0.0834 ‐0.0539 ‐0.0758 ‐0.0702 ‐0.0576 ‐0.0644 0.0580 0.0775 0.0774 0.0827 0.0739
(2.04) (2.38) (2.67) (3.12) (‐1.47) (‐2.15) (‐2.04) (‐1.65) (2.68) (3.63) (3.85) (3.91)
Annualized geometric mean 0.0497 0.0646 0.0714 0.0923 0.0695 ‐0.0717 ‐0.0920 ‐0.0857 ‐0.0732 ‐0.0807 0.0518 0.0715 0.0722 0.0770 0.0681
Panel B: Risk measures
Annualized volatility 0.1570 0.1712 0.1625 0.1749 0.1664 0.1887 0.1814 0.1759 0.1770 0.1808 0.1117 0.1098 0.1030 0.1071 0.1079
Annualized downside volatility (0%) 0.1031 0.1154 0.1153 0.1234 0.1143 0.1188 0.1084 0.1115 0.1059 0.1111 0.0695 0.0714 0.0586 0.0672 0.0667
Skewness 0.0029 ‐0.1656 ‐0.2796 ‐0.5254 ‐0.2419 0.1783 0.5543 0.1932 0.2499 0.2939 0.0560 ‐0.1206 0.2279 ‐0.0418 0.0304
Kurtosis 5.6208 6.5070 6.3005 6.9362 6.3411 4.5469 5.3478 3.4674 3.4050 4.1918 5.1952 5.2559 3.5096 3.5406 4.3753
99% VaR (Cornish‐Fisher) 0.1279 0.1544 0.1465 0.1692 0.1495 0.1431 0.1295 0.1216 0.1179 0.1280 0.0854 0.0866 0.0607 0.0698 0.0756
% of positive months 0.5455 0.5647 0.5796 0.5682 0.5645 0.4702 0.4132 0.4331 0.4416 0.4395 0.5768 0.5931 0.6019 0.5974 0.5923
Maximum run‐up (consecutive) 0.9077 1.7494 1.5868 1.7494 1.4983 1.5594 2.1533 1.8823 1.6744 1.8173 0.9104 1.2415 1.1805 1.1068 1.1098
Run‐up length (months) 8 8 10 10 9 6 7 6 5 6 7 9 20 10 12
Maximum drawdown ‐0.5011 ‐0.4913 ‐0.5028 ‐0.5825 ‐0.5194 ‐0.8986 ‐0.9512 ‐0.9329 ‐0.9067 ‐0.9224 ‐0.3075 ‐0.2884 ‐0.1970 ‐0.1497 ‐0.2357
Drawdown length (months) 24 8 10 15 14 263 263 287 263 269 43 36 13 5 24
Maximum 12M rolling return 0.5734 0.5727 0.5636 0.5334 0.5608 0.3398 0.3363 0.3715 0.3010 0.3372 0.4002 0.3845 0.3769 0.3751 0.3842
Minimum 12M rolling return ‐0.5203 ‐0.5379 ‐0.5949 ‐0.7577 ‐0.6027 ‐0.8324 ‐0.6980 ‐0.5272 ‐0.6013 ‐0.6647 ‐0.1787 ‐0.2293 ‐0.1935 ‐0.1490 ‐0.1876
Panel C: Risk‐adjusted performance
Sharpe ratio 0.3950 0.4631 0.5212 0.6163 0.4989 ‐0.2857 ‐0.4178 ‐0.3990 ‐0.3252 ‐0.3569 0.5190 0.7062 0.7517 0.7722 0.6873
Sortino ratio (0%) 0.1756 0.2089 0.2346 0.2798 0.2247 ‐0.1105 ‐0.1632 ‐0.1522 ‐0.1277 ‐0.1384 0.2386 0.3362 0.3775 0.3710 0.3308
Omega ratio (0%) 1.3550 1.4390 1.5172 1.6194 1.4826 0.8080 0.7289 0.7401 0.7852 0.7656 1.4786 1.7202 1.7642 1.7781 1.6852
Long Portfolios Short Portfolios Long‐Short Portfolios
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Table 5. Stability analysis of performance of triple-screen and individual strategies. 
 
The table reports Sharpe ratios of the individual and triple-screen strategies over the: I) whole 
sample period from February 1985 to August 2011, II) two approximately equal-length periods 
from February 1985 to August 1997, and from September 1997 to August 2011, III) the 
financialization of commodity futures markets period and preceding period using January 2006 as 
approximate cutoff point, IV) the periods before and after January 2000, and V) the late 2000s 
financial crisis period and preceding period using July 2007 as approximate break date. 
 
 
I
Start period    
End period
Feb 1985  
Aug 2011
Feb 1985  
Aug 1997
Sep 1997 
Aug 2011
Feb 1985  
Dec 2005
Jan 2006 
Aug 2011
Feb 1985 
Dec 1999
Jan 2000  
Aug 2011
Feb 1985  
Jun 2007
Jul 2007  
Aug 2011
Panel A: Momentum, Term Structure and Idiosyncratic Volatility
R = 1 0.5190 0.4536 0.5745 0.4556 0.7627 0.2874 0.8045 0.4283 1.1060
R = 3 0.7062 0.4954 0.8723 0.5945 1.1144 0.4836 0.9504 0.6195 1.1063
R = 6 0.7517 0.6085 0.8648 0.7474 0.7615 0.5864 0.9334 0.7354 0.8340
R = 12 0.7722 0.7668 0.7749 0.7319 0.9045 0.6999 0.8498 0.7272 0.9965
Average 0.6873 0.5811 0.7716 0.6324 0.8858 0.5143 0.8845 0.6276 1.0107
Panel B: Momentum
R = 1 0.3748 0.8167 0.0462 0.2863 0.6933 0.5393 0.1925 0.2857 0.9776
R = 3 0.4638 0.4996 0.4356 0.3490 0.8840 0.3915 0.5460 0.3900 0.7631
R = 6 0.2111 0.0931 0.2992 0.1004 0.5798 0.0695 0.3611 0.0841 0.9031
R = 12 0.4656 0.5191 0.4265 0.3714 0.8104 0.4523 0.4799 0.4131 0.6719
Average 0.3788 0.4821 0.3019 0.2768 0.7419 0.3632 0.3949 0.2932 0.8289
Panel C: Term Structure
R = 1 0.1893 ‐0.3162 0.6459 0.1805 0.2254 ‐0.2623 0.7526 0.1297 0.4734
R = 3 0.4356 0.0005 0.8207 0.3980 0.5948 0.1341 0.8245 0.3632 0.7998
R = 6 0.4325 0.2952 0.5462 0.4768 0.2690 0.3416 0.5376 0.4218 0.4462
R = 12 0.3433 0.1902 0.4784 0.2902 0.5483 0.2432 0.4644 0.2805 0.7591
Average 0.3502 0.0424 0.6228 0.3364 0.4094 0.1142 0.6448 0.2988 0.6196
Panel D: Idiosyncratic volatility
R = 1 0.3878 0.1101 0.6700 0.3171 0.6515 0.0576 0.8479 0.3480 0.5380
R = 3 0.3759 0.1959 0.5316 0.4130 0.2484 0.2191 0.5667 0.4347 0.0790
R = 6 0.3478 0.0693 0.5848 0.3371 0.3813 0.0732 0.6767 0.4377 ‐0.1192
R = 12 0.4255 0.0576 0.7236 0.3399 0.7077 0.0776 0.8353 0.4183 0.4597
Average 0.3843 0.1082 0.6275 0.3518 0.4973 0.1069 0.7317 0.4097 0.2394
II III IV V
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Table 6. Diversification and inflation hedge of triple-screen and individual strategies. 
 
The table reports pairwise correlation coefficients between the total returns of commodity 
portfolios and the S&P 500 index returns (first column), Barclays bond index returns (second 
column) and inflation innovations (third column). Significance p-values are in parentheses. The 
sample covers the period from February 1985 to August 2011. 
 
 
  
Panel A: Momentum, Term Structure and Idiosyncratic Volatility
R = 1 ‐0.08 (0.17) 0.02 (0.69) 0.06 (0.30)
R = 3 ‐0.04 (0.53) 0.03 (0.58) 0.13 (0.02)
R = 6 ‐0.04 (0.45) 0.08 (0.20) 0.13 (0.02)
R = 12 ‐0.06 (0.30) 0.05 (0.39) 0.19 (0.00)
Average ‐0.05 0.05 0.13
Panel B: Momentum
R = 1 ‐0.05 (0.37) 0.05 (0.43) ‐0.01 (0.90)
R = 3 ‐0.03 (0.60) 0.02 (0.69) 0.08 (0.15)
R = 6 ‐0.06 (0.29) 0.08 (0.18) 0.02 (0.74)
R = 12 ‐0.04 (0.48) 0.07 (0.28) 0.11 (0.05)
Average ‐0.04 0.05 0.05
Panel C: Term Structure
R = 1 ‐0.12 (0.03) ‐0.04 (0.47) 0.12 (0.04)
R = 3 ‐0.11 (0.04) ‐0.02 (0.71) 0.13 (0.02)
R = 6 ‐0.01 (0.87) 0.01 (0.85) 0.13 (0.02)
R = 12 0.07 (0.24) 0.00 (0.96) 0.14 (0.01)
Average ‐0.05 ‐0.01 0.13
Panel D: Idiosyncratic volatility
R = 1 0.03 (0.61) ‐0.04 (0.50) 0.07 (0.25)
R = 3 ‐0.03 (0.65) ‐0.01 (0.81) 0.09 (0.11)
R = 6 ‐0.03 (0.64) ‐0.02 (0.72) 0.11 (0.04)
R = 12 ‐0.03 (0.55) ‐0.04 (0.50) 0.13 (0.02)
Average ‐0.01 ‐0.03 0.10
Panel E: S&P‐GSCI 0.13 (0.02) ‐0.01 (0.85) 0.30 (0.00)
S&P 500 Barclays Inflation shocks
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Table 7. Performance of double-screen strategies  
 
The table presents summary statistics for the returns of fully-collateralized long-short portfolios. The asset allocation is based on double-screen 
strategies that exploit two of the following three signals: momentum (Mom), term structure (TS) and/or idiosyncratic volatility (IVol). The signals are 
measured over ranking periods R ranging from 1 to 12 months. Significance t-statistics are in parentheses. The sample covers the period from 
February 1985 to August 2011. 
 
  
Double‐
Screen
R = 1 R = 3 R = 6 R = 12 Average R = 1 R = 3 R = 6 R = 12 Average R = 1 R = 3 R = 6 R = 12 Average Average
Panel A: Excess returns
Annualized arithmetic mean 0.0627 0.0904 0.0616 0.0541 0.0672 0.0460 0.0713 0.0667 0.0561 0.0600 0.0616 0.0785 0.0479 0.0561 0.0610 0.0628
(2.99) (4.52) (3.08) (2.52) (2.27) (3.65) (3.37) (2.69) (2.89) (3.50) (2.20) (2.64)
Annualized geometric mean 0.0570 0.0852 0.0565 0.0482 0.0617 0.0405 0.0663 0.0616 0.0505 0.0547 0.0556 0.0719 0.0418 0.0504 0.0549 0.0571
Panel B: Risk measures
Annualized volatility 0.1080 0.1028 0.1024 0.1090 0.1056 0.1043 0.1003 0.1012 0.1057 0.1029 0.1100 0.1154 0.1113 0.1077 0.1111 0.1065
Annualized downside volatility (0%) 0.0638 0.0565 0.0655 0.0697 0.0639 0.0710 0.0582 0.0647 0.0738 0.0669 0.0664 0.0649 0.0607 0.0639 0.0639 0.0649
Skewness 0.4756 0.3877 0.0538 0.0542 0.2428 ‐0.2854 0.1579 ‐0.0627 ‐0.3916 ‐0.1455 ‐0.1695 0.2453 0.3094 0.0274 0.1032 0.0668
Kurtosis 6.3559 4.4026 3.9366 3.9291 4.6561 6.0917 3.3144 3.9217 3.5930 4.2302 4.0462 3.8961 4.0359 3.1508 3.7822 4.2228
99% VaR (Cornish‐Fisher) 0.0782 0.0611 0.0689 0.0743 0.0706 0.0933 0.0599 0.0700 0.0776 0.0752 0.0801 0.0711 0.0700 0.0681 0.0723 0.0727
% of positive months 0.5549 0.5962 0.5701 0.5714 0.5731 0.5611 0.5804 0.5828 0.5877 0.5780 0.5893 0.5804 0.5478 0.5487 0.5666 0.5726
Maximum run‐up (consecutive) 0.7907 0.8961 0.7463 1.1424 0.8939 1.2673 1.1410 1.3539 0.7531 1.1288 0.9604 1.2063 1.2452 1.0549 1.1167 1.0465
Run‐up length (months) 6 10 8 8 8 8 8 8 12 9 7 6 6 9 7 8
Maximum drawdown ‐0.3237 ‐0.1605 ‐0.1456 ‐0.3437 ‐0.2434 ‐0.3083 ‐0.2152 ‐0.2463 ‐0.2805 ‐0.2626 ‐0.3013 ‐0.1684 ‐0.2410 ‐0.2182 ‐0.2322 ‐0.2460
Drawdown length (months) 28 9 7 62 27 36 9 8 74 32 54 47 29 12 36 31
Maximum 12M rolling return 0.3633 0.3837 0.3381 0.4533 0.3846 0.4075 0.3613 0.3663 0.3355 0.3676 0.3178 0.3238 0.3467 0.3347 0.3307 0.3610
Minimum 12M rolling return ‐0.2658 ‐0.1272 ‐0.1281 ‐0.1966 ‐0.1794 ‐0.1969 ‐0.2103 ‐0.2294 ‐0.2088 ‐0.2113 ‐0.1409 ‐0.1236 ‐0.1396 ‐0.2386 ‐0.1607 ‐0.1838
Panel C: Risk‐adjusted performance
Sharpe ratio 0.5808 0.8794 0.6023 0.4965 0.6398 0.4408 0.7108 0.6594 0.5307 0.5854 0.5599 0.6805 0.4307 0.5213 0.5481 0.5911
Sortino ratio (0%) 0.2829 0.4629 0.2853 0.2273 0.3146 0.1949 0.3511 0.3086 0.2307 0.2713 0.2554 0.3364 0.2046 0.2432 0.2599 0.2819
Omega ratio (0%) 1.5663 1.9418 1.5979 1.4628 1.6422 1.4058 1.7061 1.6408 1.4853 1.5595 1.5022 1.6629 1.3807 1.4721 1.5045 1.5687
Mom‐TS Strategy IVol‐TS Strategy IVol‐Mom Strategy
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Table 8. Liquidity risk analysis and tranquil- versus crisis-period analysis of triple-screen and individual strategies. 
 
Panel A presents coefficient estimates from regressions of the returns of long-short portfolios on the S&P-GSCI and a liquidity risk premium obtained 
à-la Pastor & Stambaugh (2003). Panel B reports annualized mean, annualized standard deviation (SD) and Sharpe ratio of returns of the long-short 
portfolios that exclude the 10% of commodities with lowest $OI at the time of portfolio formation. Panel C reports the ‘tranquil’ period alpha 
(ߙ௧௥௔௡௤௨௜௟) and the ‘crisis’ period alpha (ߙ௖௥௜௦௜௦ሻ obtained by adding to the model reported in Panel A a dummy variable equal to one from July 2007 
onwards and zero elsewhere. R is the ranking period over which the signals are modeled. Newey-West significance t-statistics are reported in 
parentheses. The sample covers the period from February 1985 to August 2011. 
 
 
 
SD Sharpe
Momentum, Term Structure and Idiosyncratic Volatility
R = 1 0.0535 (2.61) 0.0671 (1.93) 0.1616 (1.69) 0.0534 (2.61) 0.1057 0.5054 0.0396 (1.76) 0.1309 (3.36)
R = 3 0.0713 (3.89) 0.1142 (3.41) 0.1630 (1.80) 0.0689 (3.36) 0.1055 0.6530 0.0569 (2.87) 0.1406 (3.94)
R = 6 0.0716 (4.24) 0.1009 (2.55) 0.1149 (1.49) 0.0819 (4.38) 0.0956 0.8566 0.0665 (3.56) 0.0983 (2.85)
R = 12 0.0736 (4.31) 0.1467 (3.60) 0.1350 (1.80) 0.0653 (3.40) 0.0973 0.6707 0.0641 (3.46) 0.1222 (3.26)
Average 0.0675 0.1072 0.1436 0.0674 0.6714 0.0568 0.1230
Momentum
R = 1 0.0467 (1.86) 0.0264 (0.51) 0.0139 (0.16) 0.0288 (1.25) 0.1184 0.2432 0.0346 (1.27) 0.1208 (2.37)
R = 3 0.0557 (2.16) 0.0943 (1.83) 0.0511 (0.59) 0.0605 (2.55) 0.1221 0.4956 0.0432 (1.58) 0.1133 (1.61)
R = 6 0.0236 (1.18) 0.0479 (0.97) 0.0069 (0.08) 0.0394 (1.69) 0.1193 0.3302 0.0072 (0.37) 0.1153 (2.11)
R = 12 0.0568 (2.46) 0.1078 (1.63) ‐0.0281 (‐0.25) 0.0647 (2.77) 0.1185 0.5463 0.0485 (1.92) 0.0911 (1.74)
Average 0.0457 0.0691 0.0109 0.0484 0.4038 0.0334 0.1101
Term Structure
R = 1 0.0156 (0.75) 0.1214 (2.85) 0.1021 (0.97) 0.0335 (1.58) 0.1092 0.3073 0.0054 (0.25) 0.0601 (1.10)
R = 3 0.0411 (2.26) 0.0777 (1.92) 0.0609 (0.73) 0.0585 (2.97) 0.1015 0.5770 0.0324 (1.60) 0.0751 (2.33)
R = 6 0.0412 (2.33) 0.0926 (2.20) 0.0185 (0.24) 0.0422 (2.19) 0.0986 0.4277 0.0384 (2.02) 0.0515 (1.19)
R = 12 0.0328 (1.76) 0.1137 (2.74) ‐0.0182 (‐0.22) 0.0470 (2.24) 0.1063 0.4420 0.0253 (1.25) 0.0747 (1.67)
Average 0.0326 0.1013 0.0408 0.0453 0.4385 0.0254 0.0654
Idiosyncratic volatility
R = 1 0.0400 (2.14) 0.0381 (0.96) 0.2738 (2.63) 0.0536 (2.43) 0.1136 0.4717 0.0296 (1.42) 0.0877 (2.17)
R = 3 0.0379 (2.09) 0.0438 (1.10) 0.2719 (2.75) 0.0476 (2.22) 0.1101 0.4326 0.0391 (1.98) 0.0337 (0.71)
R = 6 0.0332 (1.73) 0.0717 (1.88) 0.2632 (2.63) 0.0367 (1.77) 0.1064 0.3452 0.0373 (1.82) 0.0111 (0.22)
R = 12 0.0405 (2.08) 0.0879 (2.66) 0.3417 (4.02) 0.0417 (1.94) 0.1090 0.3828 0.0317 (1.49) 0.0865 (1.87)
Average 0.0379 0.0604 0.2876 0.0449 0.4081 0.0344 0.0547
α crisis
Panel C. Tranquil versus crisis 
period liquidity‐robust alpha
α β S&P‐GSCI β LRP Mean α tranquil
Panel A. Liquidity‐robust alpha  Panel B. Restricted cross‐section 
with 90% of most liquid
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Table 9. Transaction costs of triple-screen and individual strategies. 
 
The table reports the annualized gross and net mean returns of the triple-screen and 
individual strategies, where the net performance is modeled relative to two levels of 
transaction cost (TC). The last column presents the break-even cost of the long-short 
portfolios defined as the transaction cost that would yield zero net returns. Significance t-
statistics are in parentheses. R is the ranking period over which the signals are modeled. 
The sample covers the period from February 1985 to August 2011. 
 
  
Break‐even  cost
Panel A: Momentum, Term Structure and Idiosyncratic Volatility
R = 1 0.0580 (2.68) 0.0537 (2.49) 0.0488 (2.26) 0.40%
R = 3 0.0775 (3.63) 0.0738 (3.44) 0.0709 (3.31) 0.92%
R = 6 0.0774 (3.85) 0.0754 (3.74) 0.0734 (3.64) 1.29%
R = 12 0.0827 (3.91) 0.0810 (3.83) 0.0795 (3.76) 1.82%
Average 0.0739 0.0710 0.0682 1.11%
Panel B: Momentum
R = 1 0.0476 (1.93) 0.0336 (1.37) 0.0196 (0.80) 0.13%
R = 3 0.0596 (2.38) 0.0554 (2.22) 0.0513 (2.05) 0.50%
R = 6 0.0255 (1.08) 0.0229 (0.97) 0.0203 (0.86) 0.33%
R = 12 0.0614 (2.36) 0.0596 (2.29) 0.0577 (2.22) 1.12%
Average 0.0485 0.0429 0.0372 0.52%
Panel C: Term Structure
R = 1 0.0206 (0.98) 0.0179 (0.85) 0.0152 (0.72) 0.26%
R = 3 0.0445 (2.24) 0.0426 (2.14) 0.0407 (2.05) 0.79%
R = 6 0.0447 (2.21) 0.0434 (2.14) 0.0420 (2.08) 1.09%
R = 12 0.0369 (1.74) 0.0362 (1.71) 0.0355 (1.67) 1.68%
Average 0.0367 0.0350 0.0333 0.96%
Panel D: Idiosyncratic volatility
R = 1 0.0454 (2.00) 0.0412 (1.81) 0.0381 (1.68) 0.50%
R = 3 0.0437 (1.93) 0.0425 (1.88) 0.0409 (1.81) 0.96%
R = 6 0.0399 (1.78) 0.0390 (1.73) 0.0380 (1.69) 1.35%
R = 12 0.0500 (2.16) 0.0495 (2.13) 0.0489 (2.11) 2.90%
Average 0.0448 0.0430 0.0415 1.43%
TC = 0% TC = 0.033% TC = 0.066%
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Figure 1. Future value of $1 invested in commodity portfolios 
 
The figure plots the future value of $1 invested in January 1985 in the S&P-GSCI, the novel 
triple-screen strategy proposed, and each of the three individual strategies based on momentum, 
term structure or idiosyncratic volatility.  
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Figure 2. Total mean returns per annum over the period July 2007 - August 2011. 
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Figure 3. Sharpe ratio versus holding period. 
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APPENDIX A  
Constituents of triple-screen portfolios  
 
The appendix presents the frequency of each commodity futures contract in entering 
the long and short triple-screen portfolios, alongside the OLS estimates of the slope 
coefficient, Newey-West significance t-statistics and adjusted R2 of equation (1) 
which regresses each commodity futures returns onto the excess returns of the S&P-
GSCI. The estimation is conducted over the entire sample period from 1985 to 2011. 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Long  (% ) Short  (% ) β S&P‐GSCI t ‐stat Adj‐R 2
Cocoa 3.27% 43.94% 0.15 (7.11) 2.24%
Coffee 3.75% 49.92% 0.22 (8.34) 3.69%
Copper 16.99% 5.66% 0.31 (9.86) 9.31%
Corn 6.38% 25.28% 0.35 (14.22) 8.03%
Cotton 16.11% 26.08% 0.22 (9.30) 3.71%
Crude oil 50.32% 3.19% 1.55 (50.05) 77.40%
Electricity 1.99% 10.61% 0.63 (12.41) 17.42%
Feeder cattle 61.32% 1.04% 0.10 (5.48) 3.12%
Gasoline 51.28% 2.31% 1.42 (69.79) 69.46%
Gold 27.43% 0.72% 0.20 (13.80) 8.39%
Heating oil 40.27% 2.87% 1.49 (47.90) 74.43%
Hogs 25.60% 24.08% 0.26 (9.26) 4.34%
Live cattle 47.53% 1.36% 0.19 (9.68) 5.63%
Lumber 15.23% 39.79% 0.05 (3.54) 0.30%
Natural gas 2.71% 40.27% 1.10 (17.71) 24.22%
Oats 5.58% 47.77% 0.33 (11.54) 4.99%
Orange 10.85% 31.18% 0.11 (5.84) 0.71%
Palladium 13.00% 18.18% 0.27 (10.05) 5.61%
Platinum 29.67% 6.86% 0.26 (11.73) 6.82%
Pork bellies 11.40% 28.47% 0.29 (6.17) 2.61%
Rough rice 1.67% 12.76% 0.14 (7.61) 4.11%
Silver 4.70% 19.62% 0.39 (13.34) 8.10%
Soybean meal 29.43% 0.64% 0.33 (13.57) 8.92%
Soybean oil 7.02% 5.98% 0.30 (12.27) 5.51%
Soybeans 13.16% 11.08% 0.31 (13.13) 9.94%
Sugar 10.69% 28.15% 0.33 (10.90) 4.15%
Wheat 12.36% 31.98% 0.37 (12.19) 7.35%
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APPENDIX B  
Causality tests of financialization of commodity markets. 
 
The appendix reports t-statistics for the null hypothesis that change in the long or short open 
interest (OI) of large speculators do not Granger-cause the returns of long-short triple-screen 
portfolios. R is the ranking period over which the signals are modeled. The sample covers the 
period from February 1985 to August 2011. 
 
 
 
 
 
Long OI Short OI Long OI Short OI Long OI Short OI Long OI Short OI
Cocoa ‐0.93 ‐0.12 0.04 ‐0.81 1.10 ‐0.50 0.70 ‐0.78
Coffee ‐0.56 ‐1.29 ‐0.25 ‐1.70 0.15 ‐1.17 0.41 ‐1.63
Copper ‐0.72 ‐1.04 0.07 ‐0.42 ‐0.44 ‐0.55 0.25 ‐1.85
Corn 0.57 ‐0.50 1.30 ‐0.17 0.61 ‐0.53 0.43 ‐0.10
Cotton 0.01 0.35 0.56 ‐0.23 0.70 ‐0.81 0.61 ‐0.61
Crude oil ‐0.09 ‐0.28 0.87 ‐1.21 0.61 0.10 1.01 ‐1.06
Electricity 1.86 ‐0.28 0.73 ‐0.45 0.76 ‐0.39 ‐0.68 ‐0.35
Feeder cattle 1.12 ‐0.40 1.17 1.00 0.42 ‐0.53 0.60 ‐0.47
Gasoline 1.79 2.68 1.66 2.23 2.19 2.28 1.99 1.80
Gold 0.46 ‐0.59 0.92 0.30 0.09 0.29 0.45 ‐0.07
Heating oil ‐0.08 ‐1.56 ‐0.07 ‐0.26 0.30 0.34 ‐0.89 0.13
Hogs ‐0.26 ‐0.06 0.71 0.08 ‐0.20 0.76 ‐0.02 0.85
Live cattle ‐0.20 1.02 ‐0.74 1.04 ‐0.99 0.16 ‐0.43 ‐0.20
Lumber 0.78 0.95 0.20 0.93 ‐0.01 0.28 0.18 ‐0.49
Natural gas ‐0.42 ‐0.79 ‐0.75 ‐0.71 ‐0.68 ‐0.27 ‐1.07 ‐0.40
Oats 1.27 ‐0.58 0.05 ‐1.16 ‐0.40 ‐1.22 0.12 ‐0.23
Orange 0.27 0.54 0.35 0.62 0.83 1.28 0.18 1.30
Palladium 0.12 ‐1.15 ‐0.34 ‐0.60 ‐0.47 0.06 ‐0.04 ‐0.76
Platinum 0.21 0.38 ‐0.11 1.23 ‐0.70 0.65 0.09 1.09
Pork bellies 0.28 ‐1.16 ‐0.13 ‐1.05 0.62 ‐1.38 0.79 ‐1.12
Rough rice ‐0.01 ‐0.26 0.40 ‐0.34 ‐0.60 ‐0.95 ‐0.26 ‐0.66
Silver ‐0.97 ‐0.31 ‐0.36 ‐0.40 ‐0.69 ‐0.36 ‐0.67 ‐0.59
Soybean meal ‐0.03 0.15 ‐0.16 0.32 ‐0.06 1.01 0.70 1.92
Soybean oil 0.52 ‐0.62 1.33 ‐0.56 0.84 ‐0.40 1.41 ‐1.51
Soybeans 0.61 ‐2.16 0.54 ‐1.65 ‐0.03 ‐1.98 ‐0.55 ‐0.32
Sugar 1.38 ‐2.43 1.20 ‐1.12 0.95 ‐0.82 0.80 ‐0.64
Wheat ‐0.45 ‐0.84 ‐0.75 ‐0.64 ‐0.72 ‐1.51 ‐0.69 ‐1.13
R=3 R=6 R=12R=1
